112905 01_FOREWORD.DOC

1/10/2006 10:21 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS
Volume 68

Summer/Autumn 2005

Numbers 3 & 4

FOREWORD:
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS
ADMINISTRATION—NATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES TO
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
BENEDICT KINGSBURY,* NICO KRISCH,**
RICHARD B. STEWART,*** & JONATHAN B. WIENER****
I
INTRODUCTION
This symposium addresses an emerging but little-studied field of legal theory and practice: Global Administrative Law. It is the first in a series of journal symposia produced by the ongoing Global Administrative Law Research
Project, based at NYU Law School.1 By way of overview, we set out in this
Foreword some core elements of the concept of Global Administrative Law
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that animates this symposium; these ideas are developed in greater detail in the
framing paper by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart.2 We then note briefly some of
the many elements that are developed in the other nine papers in the symposium.
II
CORE CONCEPTS
The concept of Global Administrative Law begins from the twin ideas that
much global governance can be understood as administration, and that such
administration is often organized and shaped by principles of an administrative
law character. The contemporary starting point is thus the rapidly changing
pattern of transnational regulation and its administration, a pattern that now
ranges from regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire), through formal selfregulation (such as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, business–NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association),
hybrid public–private regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental standards of another country), network governance by
state officials (as in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) on environmental policies to be followed by national export credit agencies), inter-governmental organizations with significant
but indirect regulatory powers (for example, regulation of ozone depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol), and inter-governmental organizations
with direct governance powers (as with determinations by the Office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the
WTO dispute resolution system for trade conflicts). Bodies that were not originally envisaged as regulators have increasingly become so. The U.N. Security
Council now regulates movements of arms, food and money in areas subject to
sanctions, and lists specific individuals whose assets are to be frozen by states
under anti-terrorism rules. The World Bank supervises developing countries in
their adoption and implementation of very detailed externally-devised standards for matters ranging from the structure of insurance markets to the conduct of environmental assessments. The Forest Stewardship Council, a private
entity, has developed detailed sets of criteria for sustainable forest use, and for
certification of products from such forests. These evolving regulatory structures
are each confronted with demands for transparency, consultation, participation,
reasoned decisions, and review mechanisms to promote accountability. These
demands, and responses to them, are increasingly framed in terms that have an
administrative law character. The growing commonality of these administrative
law-type principles and practices is building a unity between otherwise disparate areas of governance. The sense that there is some unity of proper princi-

2. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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ples and practices across these issue areas is of growing importance to the
strengthening, or eroding, of legitimacy and effectiveness in these different governance regimes.
Instead of neatly separated levels of regulation, a congeries of different actors and different layers together form a variegated “global administrative
space” that includes international institutions and transnational networks involving both governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as domestic
administrative bodies that operate within international regimes or cause transboundary regulatory effects. And, while norms of a regulatory character have
been adopted by international treaties or intergovernmental agencies with great
frequency since at least the nineteenth century, international administrative
roles and capacities until recently evolved slowly (some important early cases
excepted). The impact of global regulatory norms on sophisticated domestic legal and administrative systems was initially limited, because states retained the
freedom to refuse ratification, and governments had considerable scope to
shape the content and operation of the norms when implementing them
through their own legislative and administrative structures. Thus, while constitutional and administrative checks operated within well-functioning national
systems, only gradually were checks of comparable effectiveness considered as
serious objectives in the structuring of transnational arrangements. However,
the separation between prevailing models of domestic and international regulation has been eroding faster in practice than it has in the theory of administration. Some international bodies, such as the Clean Development Mechanism
under the Kyoto Protocol, now directly create and implement rights of individuals; other international bodies, especially regulatory networks such as the
Basle Committee of central bankers or the OECD, are composed of domestic
administrative officials whose duties now necessitate acting in global concert.
Global rules and standards effectively determine the content of much domestic
regulation, and thus significantly limit the freedom of domestic actors, in ways
that may enhance or impair the success of domestic constitutional and administrative checks. These impacts might be especially acute for developing countries
and for prosperous small states.
The problems of legitimacy raised by this shift of power and authority to extra-state processes and norms are graphic and unresolved. So too are the problems of configuring suitable democracy-respecting but functionally effective relationships between national institutions (including national and sub-national
administrative agencies and courts) and extra-national or private institutions of
global governance. The Global Administrative Law Research Project seeks to
tackle such problems from new angles, through its analysis of global governance
as administrative action. These angles include investigation of the applicability
in global governance, whether through national or extra-national institutions, of
tools and approaches developed in domestic administrative law to deal with
problems of participation, transparency, accountability, and review. They include also the construction of adapted or wholly new techniques and approaches that utilize basic administrative law ideas and values. The contribu-
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tions to this symposium take up these problems from a variety of theoretical
perspectives, and examine the practical issues arising in different types of global
regulatory institutions and regulatory subject areas that have usually been studied in relative isolation from each other.
The mechanisms of national administrative law vary significantly from country to country, but some general elements are discernible, particularly with regard to transparency and accountability in decisionmaking. These include requirements for notice, consultation, and open procedures that allow directly
affected actors and a broader public to participate; requirements of reasoned
decision in accordance with basic principles of administrative fairness and rationality; and review mechanisms, often of a judicial nature. Administrative law
can both check and steer the exercise of government power: by both protecting
individuals against unauthorized or arbitrary exercises of official power, and
also promoting administrative responsiveness to broader public interests, these
elements form an integral part of democratic systems and, more generally, ensure a basic form of accountability of public power. In an appropriately modified form, they may perform a similar function for global administrative structures. The impetus for adopting measures of this sort usually comes from
efforts by leading actors in global administrative regimes to improve internal
accountability and bolster external legitimacy. Such efforts are often stimulated
by external criticism, and in some cases also by pressures exerted by domestic
courts, which may threaten to review the decisions of global regulatory bodies
or of national agencies implementing such global decisions.
Administrative law mechanisms are indeed emerging in many different areas of global governance. They are seen in U.N. responses to the hesitant engagement of domestic courts in reviewing Security Council sanctions against individuals; in the Inspection Panel set up by the World Bank to ensure its own
compliance with its internal policies; in notice-and-comment procedures
adopted by international standard-setters such as the Basle Committee or the
OECD; in the inclusion of NGOs in regulatory bodies like the Codex Alimentarius Commission; in rules about foreign participation in domestic administrative procedures as set out in the Aarhus Convention; or in the review of domestic administrative procedures and decisions by international panels in the WTO
context. The pattern that emerges from these and other, often embryonic
mechanisms is not yet coherent: such mechanisms and principles operate in
some areas and not in others, and diverge widely in their forms. Yet the overall
picture is of widespread, and growing, commitment both to principles of transparency, participation, reasoned decision and review in global governance, and
to tempered but reasoned principles related to protecting security information,
commercial confidentiality, and negotiating effectiveness. A certain lack of coherence in these developments reflects experimentation, adaptation, and eclecticism across the heterogeneous terrain of global administrative space. This is
beginning to give rise to exchanges and mutual learning among practitioners
and scholars of the different fields. We argue that this is a general trend of
practice toward a Global Administrative Law.

112905 01_FOREWORD.DOC

1/10/2006 10:21 AM

Summer/Autumn 2005]

FOREWORD

5

In short, Global Administrative Law encompasses the legal mechanisms,
principles, and practices, along with supporting social understandings, that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies,
in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate standards of transparency,
consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by providing effective
review of the rules and decisions these bodies make. These global administrative bodies include intergovernmental institutions, informal inter-governmental
networks, national governmental agencies acting pursuant to global norms, hybrid public–private bodies engaged in transnational administration, and purely
private bodies performing public roles in transnational administration. This
field of law is described as “global” rather than “international” to reflect both
the inclusion in it of a large array of informal institutional arrangements (many
involving prominent roles for non-state actors), and its foundation in normative
practices, and normative sources, that are not encompassed within standard
conceptions of “international law.”
III
KEY QUESTIONS
We delineate five sets of questions that are essential to the study of Global
Administrative Law. The first set is primarily empirical and analytical: it asks
what administrative law mechanisms are actually emerging in global governance, how they differ from one area to another, and how they relate to the different structures of global regulatory regimes.
A second set relates to doctrinal issues: it seeks to explore whether and to
what extent the mechanisms of global administrative governance reflect legal
rules or principles of participation, transparency or review, and how far they
reach. Further, what are the sources of any such rules and principles? Can they
be accounted for by received doctrines of the sources of international law? Can
global administrative law emerge and attain effective status without a global judiciary to adopt, interpret and apply such doctrine; or will a global network of
tribunals, domestic and international, emerge to play just this role?
Thirdly, we emphasize the importance of normative questions about Global
Administrative Law, which may challenge the general merits or specific framing
of this concept, and may raise critical objections to the potential impact of such
an approach. This calls for debate on the contending normative bases for
Global Administrative Law, including on its effects on social welfare, and especially on its relationship to democracy and to justice. Should Global Administrative Law embody a commitment to substantive reasonableness, encouraging
rejection or rethinking or justification on other grounds of policies that reduce
social welfare, and promoting policies that increase social welfare? Is Global
Administrative Law dependent on a democratic framework, or can it operate
(with perhaps more limited functions) outside democratic contexts? (Does this
question depend on the level of governance, because majoritarian democracy is
more pertinent at the national level? And does it depend on the type of democ-
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racy envisioned—direct, representative, participatory, majoritarian, qualified
majoritarian, subject to countermajoritarian rights, or otherwise?) Will the
spread of global administrative law, particularly its aspirations to accountability
and participation, itself help promote democracy around the world? Or, is it
feasible or useful to bracket questions about democracy in the further development of the field, at least for the moment, given that there is not a strong international consensus about democratic norms and institutional arrangements for
global governance? Questions about power and bias are also central: are administrative law tools mostly Western concepts and thus reflections of very particular ideas about political orders that are currently being imposed on the less
powerful, or do they bear a more universal promise? Who will be the winners
and losers from greater application of global administrative law?
A fourth set of questions concerns the institutional design of administrative
law mechanisms in global regimes. Different models are competing: how
should bottom-up mechanisms, centered on checks on global regulation by domestic institutions, be balanced with top-down mechanisms in which the checks
are institutionalized in or by global bodies? To what extent is it feasible to
transplant domestic models of administrative law to global regimes that are often characterized by strong informality, diffuse responsibilities, decisions based
on consent or consensus, plural authority structures, powerful private actors,
minimal centralized legislative or executive power, and the absence of strong
independent courts? Can Global Administrative Law prosper in global regimes
that generally lack the conventional binding features of national legal institutions, including majority rule and compulsory dispute resolution before an independent judiciary? Given these features, is it more promising to look to elements of domestic administrative law that have emerged outside traditional
command administration, such as systems based on voluntary opt-in or network
negotiation and cooperation?3
Fifth and finally, it is essential to ask questions of positive political theory.
What are the factors that lead to (or hinder) the development of administrative
law mechanisms in global regulation, and under what conditions are such
mechanisms likely or unlikely to be successful? For example, are forms of review most likely to emerge and to be successful in situations where power is
delegated by a principal to an agent? Will Global Administrative Law be more
likely to emerge as a response to the accretion of rules and adjudicative systems
at the international level that bind those who have not consented to particular
norms or decision (just as national administrative law has emerged in response
to the expansion of the regulatory state), and less likely to emerge where global
institutions adhere to traditional international rules of treaty-making and adju-

3. On legal borrowing or transplantation from national to international law and attendant issues
of institutional design, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOL. L.Q. 1295 (2001).
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dication only by consent?4 Who anticipates benefiting from such mechanisms
and so has incentives to promote them? Will such mechanisms be venues for
social movements, such as those seeking change or seeking to resist elements of
globalization, or will they favor corporate or other groups that can afford to
take part in complicated administrative proceedings all over the world?
IV
SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS
These different questions are taken up in greater detail in the contributions
to this volume. As previously noted, the framework essay by Kingsbury, Krisch,
and Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,5 develops the issues
and themes outlined above in greater detail, drawing on a range of historical
and contemporary sources and illustrations from different global administrative
regimes. It provides a more extensive overview of the emerging phenomena of
Global Administrative Law, explains the different types of global administration that have emerged, examines in some detail the principal analytical, doctrinal, normative, institutional and positive political theoretical issues that they
present, and thereby indicates a possible agenda for future research of the field.
The essay is complemented by a substantial Global Administrative Law Bibliography.6
Following that framing paper, the next four papers address the development
of global administrative law from the perspective of experts in national administrative law—in the United States, Europe, and common law Commonwealth
systems such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand. The remaining five papers
focus on administrative law approaches in a variety of transborder or global
governance regimes.
Richard Stewart’s essay, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?,7 considers two means by which U.S. administrative law conceptions and tools might be applied to global regulatory regimes. Under a “bottom up” approach, he examines the difficulties faced by domestic political
actors, litigants, and courts in dealing with the global elements in domestic administrative decisions that implement or are shaped by regulatory norms
adopted by global regulatory regimes. He outlines three basic approaches that
domestic courts might take when asked to review the global elements of such
decisions: They might treat them on a par with purely domestic decisions; or,
they might impose less demanding administrative law disciplines out of deference to the need for executive flexibility in foreign affairs; finally, they might
impose more demanding disciplines on such decisions because of accountability
4. See Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87
GEO. L.J. 749 (1999).
5. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
6. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357 (Summer/Autumn 2005). The bibliography is regularly updated
at http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/index.htm.
7. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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gaps with regard to the global elements. Stewart also considers how, under a
“top down” approach, elements of U.S. administrative law might provide one
set of approaches adaptable for use within global regimes. In doing so, he provides a detailed analytical typology of global regulatory regimes and their administrative components and comments on the different functions of administrative law in these different institutional contexts. He concludes that Global
Administrative Law will likely develop further through an iterative and sometimes confrontational interaction between “top down” and “bottom up” approaches.
Sabino Cassese’s paper, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure,8 provides a detailed analysis of some “top down” approaches, examining
the influence of global norms of regulatory due process on domestic administrations. He examines ways in which global law operates in national legal systems
through procedural principles and criteria as well as substantive standards. He
takes as examples procedural norms of transparency, harmonization, equivalence, and notification, and disciplines on national regulatory certification and
control to prevent delay, discrimination, and arbitrary decisions. Cassese traces
these rules not only to international treaties such as the SPS, TBT, and GATS
Agreements, but also to the work of subsidiary administrative bodies such as
the WTO committees under those agreements and the Codex Alementarius
Commission and its committees. He emphasizes that although these procedural
norms are often not formally binding in the national legal order, trade agreements give states substantial incentives to follow them. Many of these procedural norms have a strongly horizontal aspect; they encourage states to open
their domestic regulatory regimes reciprocally by adoption of procedural rules
to promote various forms of transnational regulatory dialogue and coordination. Harmonization is encouraged, not imposed from on high (the WTO
model thus differs from that of the E.U.). Private actors are increasingly interested in these procedural rules and seek to use them to advance their interests.
Cassese highlights the unsustainability of the traditional dichotomy between
regulation of international administration by international law on the one hand
and regulation of domestic administration by domestic administrative law on
the other. He warns, however, against uncritically transposing conceptions of
domestic administrative law to the very different international institutional context. At the global level, administrative law is multipolar rather than hierarchical, enforcement capacity is weak, and the functions of administrative law are
often very different than in domestic settings. His analysis suggests that while
many of the principles of administrative law developed in the domestic context
may have relevance for global governance, their institutionalization and their
regulative role must necessarily be very different across different global contexts.

8. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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In his paper, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law,9 David
Dyzenhaus draws on experience in several Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, England, and New Zealand) to present a natural law conception of
the role of national judges in common law systems when dealing with global
governance issues. He finds that these judges review official acts of a traditionally prerogative character for compliance with rule of law principles and international human rights norms that lack an explicit basis in positive law, taking as
examples cases in which courts have overturned deportation decisions as contrary to international human rights norms even when these norms are not binding within the national legal system. Dyzenhaus argues that these common law
judges have been amenable to the influence of international law because they
reject positivist assumptions that have led to the marginalization of international law within domestic legal orders, and have accordingly been able to recognize international law norms as a component of the rule of law conceptions
that they apply. Dyzenhaus considers the current system by which states automatically freeze the assets of persons listed—without notice or opportunity for
hearing—by the Security Council’s 1267 Committee as terrorist financiers, and
argues that this practice is contrary to rule-of-law principles as well as to precedents established by Commonwealth courts in analogous cases. He concludes
that the natural law conceptions of the rule of law and international human
rights reflected in these decisions apply fully to the international order itself, including global regulatory regimes, as well as to domestic officials, and that international law must become more institutionally mature by developing more
adequate mechanisms to secure these rule of law and human rights norms.
Janet McLean’s paper, Divergent Legal Conceptions of the State: Implications for Global Administrative Law,10 also looks at Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States, but focuses attention on the implications of radical differences between the unified and eternal conception of the state in international
law and the disaggregated and temporally contingent conception of the government prevalent in the national administrative law of these common law
countries. Whereas this disaggregated common law approach has facilitated judicial review of administrative action as a means to uphold a variety of courtdriven legal values (while also accommodating distinctive features of the particular polity), the unified approach of international law has led to individual
states being treated as abstract units devoid of any special histories or distinctive contemporary features. She suggests that if this unified approach to the
state is taken in the developing global administrative law, it will be difficult for
useful substantive values and outcomes to be realized through global administrative law. The opposition between the common law and international law approaches is perhaps being dissipated, as both national courts and global bodies
confront the difficulties of applying administrative law to the proliferating range

9. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
10. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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of privatized entities, public–private partnerships, and private governance institutions within states and in global governance. Although this proliferation
makes for more seamless integration between these forms of national governance and global governance, the increasingly prevalent pattern of private or hybrid bodies in global governance paradoxically makes the effective pursuit of
substantive values through global administrative law even more improbable.
The group of papers dealing with administrative law regimes in specific
transnational governance arrangements begins with James Salzman’s paper,
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.11 In four cases studies, he documents some striking divergences in approaches to participation, transparency, and accountability in
different substantive areas of the work of a single organization. These divergences, which are made possible by the network governance character of the
OECD and by decentralization of operational control within the OECD to issue-based networks usually built by national government officials, are evident
both in rulemaking and supervision. As to rulemaking, whereas negotiations in
the OECD on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) failed in 1998, in
part because the OECD was denounced for limiting the negotiations to states
and keeping them confidential, the OECD succeeded in 2003 in adopting a
Recommendation on environmental policies to be followed by national export
credit agencies. This process resembled the MAI process in not involving
NGOs or business much at the OECD level, but in this case member states consulted such groups extensively and publicly in their own polities, and the final
text was quite widely supported. A third approach is the OECD system for mutual acceptance of data (MAD) on product testing, with its related test guidelines and principles of good laboratory practice. This system is not highly publicized, but involves large numbers of experts and specialist NGOs as well as
national regulators in a process of continual information exchange and adjustment. As to supervision, the MAD rules are supervised primarily by the national authorities where a laboratory is located, but this is buttressed by queries
from foreign regulators, and an informal system of mutual joint visits by foreign
authorities. Supervision of the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, which
in prior decades was by an ineffective complaints process within the OECD, has
since 2000 been decentralized with some success, each state being required to
designate a national contact point to investigate alleged violations by corporations legally based in that state even if committed elsewhere.
Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, in their paper Global Private Governance:
Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting,12 explain
current and possible future administrative law-type principles in the work of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB and its supporting (private) transnational governance structure were established in 2001,

11. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
12. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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largely by reference to a long-existing U.S. model. Mattli and Büthe therefore
present a detailed study of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and its private governance structure, which since 1972 has exercised
powers delegated by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
establish “generally accepted accounting principles” for businesses in the U.S.
Governments delegate such standard-setting powers to private bodies for several reasons, which include benefiting from their existing expertise, the comparative advantage of such bodies in future maintenance of the expertise necessary to produce operable and efficient standards for fast-evolving industry
practices, and the attractiveness to government politicians of being able to attribute responsibilities for failures to an independent body. Mattli and Büthe
hypothesize that because the political costs of accounting standards failures
(such as the collapse of Enron) usually outweigh the political benefits that come
from the success of those standards, politicians might not want tight administrative controls to ensure close accountability for the effectiveness of FASB regulation of private entities: such strict accountability will make it more difficult to
avoid political responsibility. At a structural level, they focus particularly on a
central problem: the FASB as an agent has multiple principals. Those principals include both the private entities that established it and appoint its members, and the SEC. This problem is more acute in relation to the IASB, because
the public principal is not a single entity but a multiplicity of national government and E.U. agencies. Mattli and Büthe note that shifts in the Zeitgeist, such
as the spur that both the Enron failure and comparable scandals provided to reduce the dominance of big corporations in the FASB process, often lead to
symbolic changes; but changes that truly affect later outcomes are likely to be
much rarer given current structures and incentives.
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, in their paper Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government,13 describe
and advocate the existing horizontal systems in which one state recognizes
(usually on a reciprocal basis) the applicability and adequacy of the standards
or conformity and certification arrangements used in another state in order to
trade in goods and services. Their normative view is that, while democracy is
likely to remain largely a national phenomenon, transnational governance can
and should encompass some democratic elements, such as accountability. They
therefore focus on means that mutual recognition structures employ to achieve
accountability horizontally between regulators of different states, and diagonally between regulators and foreign private actors—including through procedural participation of non-citizens, requirements to issue reasoned decisions,
and review mechanisms. Their study highlights challenges for global administrative law arising from tensions between two different patterns of cooperation:
a trust-based global governance emphasizing balances between market liberalization and social regulation, and a harder-edged security orientation that has

13. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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intensified in the United States and in other states since September 2001. They
note, too, the inequities that vast power asymmetries produce in all forms of
global governance, but defend mutual recognition as potentially more tolerant
and less inequitable than some other governance models.
Eyal Benvenisti’s essay, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of
the Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institutions,14 uses a public
choice perspective to examine how global administrative law may be shaped by
the interests of different actors—national governments, domestic economic and
political interests, and global regime officials and institutions—and the interactions among them in different institutional settings. Benvenisti draws on the
public choice literature in the United States, which explains administrative law
arrangements primarily in terms of the political incentives of legislators to control executive decisions in order to deliver benefits to their political supporters,
the pursuit of competition among domestic political interests, and the opportunities of relatively insulated judges to play substantive roles in the context of
stalemates among political forces. He hypothesizes that the evolution of global
administrative law will be influenced by the extent and nature of power disparities among states in different contexts; by competition between national governments (who seek to exploit global decisionmaking to escape domestic political constraints) and other domestic political actors; and by internal competition
among actors, including tribunals, within global regimes. Benvenisti draws on
these factors in a schematic way to point to possible explanations of the development (or lack of development) of administrative law in four settings: in the
E.U., where the European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance have exploited legislative impasse and seized the initiative; in the WTO, where North
and South have divided over increasing transparency and participation in Dispute Settlement Body proceedings; in the U.N., with regard to judicial review of
the legality of Security Council decisions; and in the International Court of Justice, with regard to its role in the evolution of international administrative law.
He concludes that both the content of administrative law norms and the roles of
the institutional actors who create them will reflect the balance of power within
international institutions, in much the same way as comparable balances of
power operate in domestic settings. But he emphasizes that a comparative
study must be wary of easy generalizations, and must be highly sensitive to the
particular institutional and political context.
Martin Shapiro’s concluding essay, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?,15 draws on experience with transnational regulation in the E.U. as an instructive example for considering similar global regulatory and governance issues. Shapiro emphasizes
the inherent conflict between democratic political conceptions of administration
and technocratic conceptions based on specialized expertise, noting prior efforts

14. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
15. 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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to resolve or manage this dilemma, including, in the United States, New Deal
innovations and a tradition of elite generalist civil servants. He then considers
whether developments in regulatory governance in the E.U., including the
comitology process of decision by experts from national governments, the embrace of deliberative democracy, and the development of independent agencies,
represent a solution to this dilemma in the global context that is superior to direct bargaining among states and might provide a desirable model for transnational administrative governance generally. His answer is broadly negative. In
particular, he argues that in the E.U. concepts of deliberative democracy are being hijacked to legitimate non-democratic decision-making by technocrats with
strong policy preferences of their own, and thereby potentially also to enhance
the policy leverage of powerful private interests. Shapiro concludes that the
development of U.S.-style interest-representation models of administrative law
implemented by courts can be a useful corrective to these tendencies, thereby
giving a qualified endorsement to this strategy of global administrative law; but
warns that this strategy can generate its own excesses as well.
V
TOWARD GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Taken together, these symposium contributions provide substantial evidence that a Global Administrative Law is emerging within a global administrative space, and that this field of law and practice is worthy of study, theorizing,
and more systematic and reflective development. The contributions also confirm that this emerging field is highly variegated: Global Administrative Law is
emerging in different ways in different settings involving different types of regimes and subjects of regulation, building different structures and procedures of
accountability, to suit different needs, in response to different actors and incentives. Global Administrative Law is evolving through observation, critique, and
borrowing across national legal systems that are increasingly interdependent.
Different systems of national administrative law are also furnishing concepts for
16
global regimes to borrow. Those regimes are also developing independent and
novel responses to their specific institutional setting and accountability issues.
This symposium represents a first effort to survey the different elements of
these important trends and pose questions for further analysis and development
of the field of Global Administrative Law.

16. See Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 3.

